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We, the people! Democratisation and the delineation
of citizenship in the Netherlands, 1795-1922
Peter A.J. VAN DEN BERG *
Since the end of the eighteenth century, the principle of popular sovereignty has
become the political theoretical foundation of an increasing number of states.
Government was no longer legitimised by the droit divin, but by the consent of the
‘nation’. Consequently, the political organisation of these states has been
dominated by two different ideals, the ideal of political participation of the majority
of citizens, and the ideal of a more or less homogenous nation. In the words of
Habermas, the nation state and democracy are twins born out of the French
Revolution. In this paper, the relation between these two phenomena is investigated
more closely. It will be argued that there is a close connection between the
requirements for citizenship as a means to delineate the ‘nation’ and the
arrangements with regard to political participation, as a means of implementing
democracy. The historical development of political participation and citizenship in
the Netherlands between 1795 and 1922 serves as a case study to illustrate this
argument. The conclusion is that if the right to participate in the political process is
granted to larger numbers of citizens, the requirements for obtaining citizenship
will become stricter.
1. Renaissance of a republican ideal of citizenship
Each state not only has a specified territory, but also a demos, or people, made
up of those persons attributed to that state. International relations between states
alone make this necessary, because it has to be clear which persons will benefit
from the privileges and protection abroad. Consequently, all states have to describe
the requirements a person has to fulfil in order to be regarded as a member of the
demos. The boundaries of the community of subjects, or to use a more modern term
‘citizens’, have to be determined. In the course of this process of inclusion and
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exclusion, each state has developed its own criteria that are sometimes very strict,
and sometimes very generous. The reasons for the adoption of certain criteria can
be of a practical nature. A sparsely populated country or a country in need of
labourers for its industry might develop a liberal policy on citizenship. There can
also be, however, more fundamental reasons for the specific arrangements of
citizenship in a state, for example its ideological and political foundations. In this
paper, it is argued that there is a connection between the requirements for
citizenship and the arrangements as to political participation. The idea is, then, that
if the right to participate in the political process is granted to a large number of
citizens, the requirements for obtaining citizenship will be relatively strict. The
historical development of citizenship and political participation in the Netherlands
between 1795 and 1922 will serve here as a case study to illustrate this idea.
It should be realised that political participation of the majority of the citizens is
not a matter of course. During the Ancien Régime, the relation between subjects and
the state was mainly considered to be a passive one. Being a ‘subject’ of a state did
not normally carry the right to participate in the political process. Bodin, Hobbes,
Locke and Montesquieu all describe a subject as somebody who is primarily
granted (some) security of life and of property, not the right to vote or to be eligible
for public office.1) The state, in other words, provides a framework for private
activities, such as family life and running a business, not for public activities. These
were reserved for a small elite. To sum up, society was predominantly a ‘civil
society’, not a ‘political community’.2) In ancient Greece, however, a different ideal
of citizenship had developed, which could be called a ‘republican citizenship’.
Membership of society was not considered to just mark the legal outlines of life,
but was seen as its very essence. This Republican citizenship presupposes a tight
political community, in which every citizen is actively participating in politics. The
definition of ‘a citizen’ given by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC) is
significant: ‘a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed’.3) At the
end of the eighteenth century, this ideal of a republican citizenship was revived
with the espousal of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The appeal of the slogan
‘We, the people’ in the course of the American Revolution is telling in this respect.
The influence of the writings of Rousseau on this revival can hardly be
overestimated. After all, Rousseau emphasised the importance of creating a
1) M. Walzer, “Citizenship”, in Political innovation and conceptual change, ed. T. Ball, J.
Farr, and R.L. Hanson, (Cambridge, 1989), 211-219 (215-216).
2) Walzer, “Citizenship”, 212.
3) Aristotle, The Politics, ed. S. Everson, (Cambridge, 1988), 71 (lines 42-43).
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sovereign people, or ‘nation’, made up of politically active citizens. In his Contrat
Social (1762), he writes: ‘A l’égard des associés ils prennent collectivement le nom
de peuple, et s’appellent en particulier citoyens comme participant à l’autorité
souveraine’ [With regard to the participants in the contract, they take collectively
the name ‘people’, and individually ‘citizens’ because they participate in the
sovereign authority].4) It should be noted that Rousseauian citizenship was not only
about promoting democratic principles. He was also looking for a way in which
smaller nations could survive international competition.5) His solution was to
enable all inhabitants to identify themselves with the ‘nation’ by granting them the
right to participate somehow in the political process. He was convinced that citizens
would then be motivated to defend their country.
There were of course some important differences between this ‘modern’
republican citizenship and the classical ideal.6) Firstly, it became connected to a
theory of formal consent.7) Citizens were supposed to have concluded a social
contract and thus to have agreed to the ‘constitution’. Secondly, it was not longer
required that citizens were directly involved in the decision-making process. A
representative democracy, in ancient Greece regarded as the opposite of democracy,
became acceptable.8) Even Rousseau, who favoured direct democracy, understood
that under certain circumstances a system of representative government was
necessary.9) Thirdly, the principle of equality became closely associated with
citizenship. Unlike in ancient Greece, the exclusion of large groups of inhabitants
from citizenship was now problematic. Ideally, all inhabitants should also be
citizens and as such full members of the political community with equal rights.10)
Granting the right to political participation might further the democratic
principle, and it could contribute to the strength of a state, but the revival of the
ideal of a republican citizenship also created a loyalty problem. During the Ancien
Régime, the loyalty of ordinary citizens was not considered very important since the
4) Rousseau, Contrat social, book 1, chapter 6. J. Merrick, “Conscience and citizenship in
eighteenth-century France”, in Eighteenth-Century Studies 21 (1987), 48-70 (48-49).
5) Peter A.J. van den Berg, The politics of European codification. A history of the unification of
law in France, Prussia, the Austrian Monarchy and the Netherlands (Groningen, Europa
Law Publishing, 2007), 155-157.
6) Cf. B.S. Turner, “Outline of a theory of citizenship”, in Sociology 24 (1990), 189-217 (201-
203).
7) Walzer, “Citizenship”, 212.
8) B. Manin, The principles of representative government (Cambridge, 1997), 1-7, 41 and 236.
9) Cf. his Considération sur le Gouvernement de Pologne (1772).
10) Cf. R. Bendix, Nation-building and citizenship (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1977), 122.
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majority was excluded from political participation. As a result, a positive
description of citizenship was often lacking. Sahlin argues that in this period the
quality of ‘French subject’ was attributed in a negative way: everybody in France
who was not foreign was regarded as French.11) The problem of loyalty was solved
by limiting access to political participation, not by restricting admission to
citizenship. With the rise of the ideal of a republican citizenship, this solution
became problematic, since according to that ideal all citizens would have the right
to participate politically. If citizenship was granted to (almost) all inhabitants,
allowing them to be actively involved in politics, their loyalty to the community
would become an issue.
The answer of Rousseau to this problem of loyalty was simple. In his view, all
members of society should be imbued with patriotism from the moment they were
born. In this way, all citizens would have more or less the same opinions about
things; they would, in other words, share an identity. Thus, the introduction of
republican citizenship brought about the ideal of a homogeneous nation. In practice,
however, it became clear that the issue of the loyalty of citizens was not so easy to
deal with. Obviously, not everybody would be able to fit the pattern, especially not
those from foreign origin. Consequently, membership of the nation became
exclusive. It turned out, however, to be quite difficult to give positive criteria to be
met for admission to citizenship. After all, the concept of identity is rather vague.
What are the necessary characteristics of being French, Dutch, or Japanese? It is a
question that still haunts us. This should not come as a surprise, because since the
end of the eighteenth century, the political organisation of most Western states is
dominated by the two closely connected ideals emanating from republican
citizenship, the democratic ideal of citizens participation and the ideal of a
homogenous nation.12) According to the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas,
‘The nation state and democracy are twins born out of the French Revolution’.13)
In this paper, the connection between these two ideals will be investigated in
more detail, focussing on the Netherlands. Since the end of the eighteenth century,
political participation of citizens has been extended in that country, culminating in
the introduction of universal suffrage for all citizens in 1922.14) In the same period,
11) P. Sahlins, Unnaturally French. Foreign citizens in the Old Regime and after (Ithaka,
London, 2004), 4-5.
12) An obvious exception with regard to the ideal of a homogenous nation is Switzerland, where
four official languages are recognised.
13) J. Habermas, “Citizenship and national identity: some reflections on the future of Europe”,
in Praxis International 12 (1992), 2.
14) Cf. for this development: C.B. Wels, “Stemmen en kiezen 1795-1922”, in Tijdschrift voor
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the status of Dutch citizenship changed radically as well. Firstly, being a Dutch
citizen became an essential requirement for political participation. Today,
foreigners are not eligible for important public offices, for example in the judiciary
or in Parliament.15) They are also excluded from the right to vote in provincial and
national elections.16) Secondly, the leading principle in Dutch nationality law is
now the ius sanguinis, meaning that Dutch citizenship is primarily granted to
children of Dutch parents.17) The political community has in fact become closed to
a large extent. New members are not easily admitted, whereas great efforts are
made to retain existing members.18) The question to be answered here is how the
growth of democracy and the delineation of citizenship precisely developed in the
course of the nineteenth century? To fully appreciate the changes brought about by
the revival of the ideal of republican citizenship, it is necessary to start with a
succinct sketch of the situation of political participation and citizenship during the
Ancien Régime.19)
2. ‘Citizenship’ and political participation in the Republic of the United
Provinces of the Netherlands, 1648-1795
The Republic of the United Provinces was, according to the Unie van Utrecht
(1579), the treaty that became its de facto constitution, a loose confederation of
Geschiedenis 92 (1979), 313-332. Cf. also L. Blok, “Van eene wettelijke fictie tot eene
waarheid. Beschouwingen over kiesstelsel en kiesrecht in Nederland in de eerste helft van de
negentiende eeuw”, in Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 92 (1979), 391-412.
15) Art. 54 (1) GW (1983). It should be noted, however, that there are at present almost a
million Dutch citizens with a (second) passport of another country.
16) Art. 56 GW (1983). Recently, the right to vote in local elections has been granted to citizens
of EU-Member States if they chose domicile in another Member State. Cf. Art. 22 (1) TFEU
(formerly Art. 19 (1) EC-Treaty, and before that Art. 8 B (1) EC-Treaty), further elaborated
in directive 94/80/EC (19-12-1994), OJL (31-12-1994) 368/38-47. In the Netherlands,
citizens of non-EU-Member States have the right to vote in these elections after a residency
of five years.
17) Arts. 3 ff. Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap (1984). G.R. de Groot/M. Tratnik, Het
Nederlands nationaliteitsrecht (Deventer, 2002), 89 ff. There are, of course, other ways of
acquiring Dutch citizenship. Those born on Dutch territory have a privileged position in this
respect, and there is always the possibility of naturalisation.
18) Cf. E.J.M. Heijs, Van Vreemdeling tot Nederlander. De verlening van het Nederlanderschap
aan vreemdelingen (1813-1992) (Amsterdam, 1995), who argues that there is a close
connection between the policy regarding naturalisation and the ideal of the nation state.
19) Cf. Peter A.J. van den Berg, “Inboorlingschap en ingezetenschap in de Republiek der
Verenigde Nederlanden, 1600-1795”, in Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 71 (2003), 125-
153.
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sovereign provinces and autonomous cities.20) Each province, therefore, regarded
the inhabitants of the other provinces as ‘foreigners’. Consequently, one could
hardly speak of a ‘Dutch people’. Over time, however, something had developed
that resembled ‘Dutch citizenship’.21) This was the result of the fact that
internationally the Republic operated as one state, with a single citizenship. This
‘Dutch citizenship’ was derived from the legal status a person enjoyed on a
provincial or local level. In the relation with other states, citizens of cities or
provinces were automatically treated as ‘citizens of the Republic’.
In accordance with the confederal nature of the constitution, each province or
city could decide on admittance to citizenship independently, but usually the ius
domicilii was applied. This meant that the status of ‘citizen’ could be acquired after
having been domiciled for a certain period, varying from five months to two years.
The quality of ‘citizen’ was, in principle, lost if domicile was chosen elsewhere. In
this way, it was relatively easy for an immigrant to become citizen. As long as one
had certain financial means, and/or was able to prove to be a reliable person, one
was usually admitted to a city or province.22)
There is a good explanation for this flexibility as to the acquisition and loss of
citizenship. After all, this status was not very important, in particular not in the
context of political participation. Firstly, the political system was not democratic, so
there were no elections and thus no voting rights. Secondly, most of the population
was de facto excluded from public offices. In addition, many provinces required
that candidates for the more important public offices were born within the borders
of their territory. Thus, immigrants were not eligible to those offices.
It should be noted that admittance to citizenship was not that easy for those not
adhering to the Calvinist version of Christianity. Especially Jews, and to a lesser
extent, Roman Catholics and other dissenters suffered discrimination in this
respect.23) In many Dutch cities, Jews were not admitted as citizens and even in
Amsterdam, a city with a large Jewish minority, their citizenship was subject to
limitations. Once admitted, however, they were also treated as Dutch citizens in the
20) J.I. Israel, The Dutch Republic. Its rise, greatness, and fall 1477-1806 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1995), 276-277.
21) A.A.H. Struycken, Het staatsrecht van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Arnhem, 1928),
243.
22) S.J. van Geuns, Proeve eener geschiedenis van de toelating en vestiging van vreemdelingen
in Nederland, tot het jaar 1795 (Utrecht, 1853), 273.
23) Van den Berg, “Inboorlingschap en ingezetenschap”, 134 (Roman-Catholics), 136-137 and
141 (Jews). In France, on the contrary, citizens were supposed to be Roman Catholic.
Merrick, “Conscience and citizenship”, 52.
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relation with other states.
3.  The Batavian Republic (1795-1806)
In 1795, the Batavian Revolution was staged with help of the French. As a
result, many of the ideas of the French Revolution of 1795 were adopted, among
them the idea of a sovereign nation. Consequently, the concept of the ‘Batavian
people’ or ‘nation’ became the theoretical foundation of the new political order.
The first line of the Constitution of 1798 is significant in this respect, starting with
‘The Batavian People, constituting itself into an indivisible state (…)’.
In accordance with the newly adopted ideology, important steps were taken in
the direction of democratisation. The Batavian Constitution of 1798 (Staatsregeling
1798) witnesses a substantial increase of the number of inhabitants that were
allowed to vote in the elections for the representative bodies, even if its democratic
quality is maybe a little disappointing when judged from a present-day
perspective.24) In the debates preceding the adoption of this new Constitution, the
influence of the process of democratisation on the concept of ‘citizenship’ is clearly
visible.25) In particular the presence of a Jewish community prompted some
delegates to the National Assembly to call for a more limited membership of the
Batavian nation, since this membership would, in principle, imply the right to
political participation. They suggested, in other words, that Batavian citizenship
should only be granted if certain criteria as to loyalty and homogeneity were met. In
their view, most of the Jews regarded themselves as a separate nation, wishing to
return to their homeland Israel. Consequently, these Jews should not be considered
Batavian citizens, despite the fact that most of them had lived in the Netherlands for
centuries, unless they were willing to assimilate.
This discussion did not result, however, in more strict requirements for
admittance to the membership of the ‘Batavian people’. It turned out that answering
questions about the necessary characteristics of being a member of the ‘Batavian
nation’ was far from easy, especially since the concept of a politically relevant
‘nation’ was completely new. After all, the elected delegates had to come up with a
24) T. Veen, “Het volk, de leden van de maatschappij en de ingezetenen van de Republiek.
Opmerkingen over het democratisch gehalte van de Bataafse Staatsregeling van 1798”, in
De Staatsregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk van 1798, ed. O. Moorman van Kappen/E.C.
Coppens, (Nijmegen, 2001), 9-33 (26-30).
25) Cf. Peter A.J. van den Berg, “The integrative function of constitutions: a historical
perspective”, in The constitutional integrity of the European Union, ed. F. Amtenbrink/Peter
A.J. van den Berg, (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010), 13-53 (34-37).
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new Constitution in a relatively short period of time, burdened with political
turmoil. They simply did not have enough time to thoroughly grasp the new
concept. In the end, therefore, they decided to adhere to the old system primarily
based on the flexible ius domicilii. The problem of loyalty was also solved in the
traditional way, namely by limiting political participation, particularly of those
citizens who were not born on the territory of the Batavian Republic. According to
the Constitution of 1798, these citizens only had the right to vote after having been
domiciled in the Republic for more than ten years. 26) In addition, they had to show
proficiency in the Dutch language. Their eligibility to important public offices was
also limited.
In the few remaining years of the Batavian Republic, the Constitution of 1798
was replaced twice, in 1801 and in 1805. The system of admittance to citizenship
and political participation was left unchanged, however. It was still relatively easy
for non natives to obtain Batavian citizenship, but they were excluded from the
right to vote or to exercise a public office for several years.27)
4.  The Netherlands under Napoleonic rule, 1806-1813
The Batavian Republic was short lived. In 1806, Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte
(1769-1821) replaced it by a monarchy, headed by his brother Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte (1778-1846). It was hardly surprising that the democratic experiment
was put on hold, though representative institutions remained in place. In the new
Kingdom of Holland, the right to vote in elections was only granted to those who
paid a substantial amount of taxes.28) Moreover, the political participation
principles of the previous constitutions, using the distinction between natives and
immigrants, remained in tact. Those not born within the borders of the Kingdom
had to wait for twelve years before they could qualify for the right to vote. In
addition, they were not eligible for important public offices.
Some substantial changes in the requirements with regard to citizenship were
brought about, however, not as a corollary of democratisation, but under the
influence of the French Code civil of 1804. It was Emperor Napoleon who ordered
his brother to introduce a codification based on his own Code civil, which included
26) Art. 11 Staatsregeling 1798.
27) Arts. 24-25, 29, 54 and 89 Staatsregeling 1801. Arts. 19, 42 and 78 Staatsregeling 1805.
28) Act of April 17, 1807, in Verzameling van wetten van Zijne Majesteit den Koning van
Holland II (Amsterdam, 1809), 14-20. This Act served as the implementation of Art. 14
Constitution 1806. Cf. for the requirements to be eligible to a public office: Arts. 30, 52 and
71 Constitution 1806.
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important provisions on French citizenship.29) At first, however, the new King
aimed at a codification that salvaged much of traditional Dutch law. He, therefore,
ordered the lawyer Joannes van der Linden (1756-1835) to prepare a ‘Dutch’ civil
code. Within a year, Van der Linden produced a draft, which included provisions
on citizenship that were in accordance with the traditional Dutch system, meaning
based on the ius domicilii.30) The proposal to adhere to this more generous system is
hardly surprising. Given the lack of democratisation, there was no need for
introducing stricter criteria for granting citizenship. The Emperor did not accept
such a deviation from his Code Napoleon, however, and King Louis had to give in.
In 1809, the ‘Code Napoleon adapted to the Kingdom of Holland’ (hereinafter
WNH) was promulgated. This codification was not a replica of the French model in
all respects, but the regulation of citizenship was copied more or less.
The newly adopted criteria were stricter, because the French system was not
based on the ius domicilii, but on a combination of ius sanguinis and ius soli.
According to the first principle, Dutch citizenship was acquired by children from
Dutch parents, regardless where they were born.31) Following the second principle,
children born on Dutch territory also became Dutch citizens, regardless the
nationality of the parents.32) They only had to choose domicile in the Netherlands at
the moment they reached the age of 23. The main difference with the traditional
Dutch system was that immigrants no longer were able to acquire citizenship
merely by residency.
In 1811, still not satisfied with his grip on the Netherlands, Napoleon abolished
the Kingdom of Holland and annexed it to France. Consequently, the original Code
civil was introduced in the Netherlands. Since the criteria for citizenship in the
WNH were largely derived from the Code civil, nothing changed in that respect.
5.  Independence and restoration, 1813-1848
After the defeat of Napoleon, in 1813, the Netherlands regained independence.
It became a monarchy, ruled by the House of Orange. The political theoretical
foundation of this monarchy was emphatically not popular sovereignty. There were
some representative institutions, to be sure, but a census severely limited the
29) Cf. P.A.J. van den Berg, “La codification et la formation d’un État national sous le Roi
Louis”, in Louis Bonaparte. Roi de Hollande (1806-1810), ed. A. Jourdan, (Paris, Nouveau
Monde éditions, 2010), 81-100 (88).
30) J. van der Linden, Ontwerp Burgerlijk Wetboek 1807/1808 (Amsterdam, 1967), 25 (Arts.
I.1.4 and I.1.7).
31) Art. 10 WNH, an accurate translation of Art. 10 Cc.
32) Art. 9 WNH, which was based on Art. 9 Cc.
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elective procedures from a democratic point of view. Only after 1848,
democratisation became a serious option again. The political conservatism of the
new regime manifested itself also in the fact that the traditional Dutch system of
admittance to political participation remained unchanged, meaning that the
distinction between natives and immigrants was still crucial. According to the
Constitution of 1815, those not born within the borders of the Kingdom were
excluded from membership of the Estates General (or Parliament), the Council of
State, the Supreme Court and some other governmental institutions.33) In addition,
the period of residency required to obtain the right to vote in elections was
considerably longer for non natives.34)
Given the lack of democratisation, it is hardly surprising that the criteria for
obtaining citizenship were not tightened. As a matter of fact, the French Code civil,
including the provisions on citizenship, remained in force for no less than 25
years.35) Soon after independence was declared, it is true, there was some
opposition to the continuing of legislation introduced by the occupying forces. At
first, King William I, who reigned from 1813 to 1840, answered these calls,
ordering Joan Melchior Kemper (1776-1824) to prepare a new, truly Dutch civil
code.36) Unsurprisingly, Kemper suggested in his draft of 1816 to return to the
traditional Dutch criteria for citizenship, which is to the ius domicilii.37) This would
have implied a liberalisation when compared to the requirements of the existing
Code civil, since it would become easier for immigrants to obtain Dutch citizenship
by residence. The draft was not discussed in Parliament before 1820, however,
because Belgium had become part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815.38)
For that reason, the Belgians had to be consulted on the draft.39) When finally in
33) Arts. 8 and 9 Constitution 1815. In the Constitution of 1840, these provisions were retained
as Arts. 7-8. Cf. H.T. Colenbrander, Ontstaan der Grondwet II (The Hague, 1909), 166-167.
Heijs, Van Vreemdeling tot Nederlander, 18-19.
34) Cf. L. Blok, Stemmen en kiezen. Het kiesstelsel in Nederland in de periode 1814-1850
(Groningen, 1987), 52-78.
35) J.H.A. Lokin, “De receptie van de Code civil in de Noordelijke Nederlanden”, in Groninger
Opmerkingen en Mededelingen 21 (2004), 1-15 (7-8).
36) Y.M.I. Greuter-Vreeburg, De codificatie van het erfrecht 1798-1838 (Zutphen, 1987), 13.
37) Cf. Arts. 102, 105-107, 109-110 and 113 Ontwerp Burgerlijk Wetboek voor het Koningrijk
der Nederlanden I (1816).
38) The political union between Belgium and the Netherlands was short lived. After a revolt in
1830, independence of Belgium was recognised by the Netherlands in 1839.
39) Cf. J. Gilissen, “De Belgische commissie van 1816 tot herziening van het Ontwerp-
Burgerlijk Wetboek voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden”, in Tijdschrift voor
Rechtsgeschiedenis 35 (1967), 383-443.
83OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW No. 58 (February 2011)
1820 the draft was sent to Parliament, the anti-French feelings obviously had faded.
A majority of delegates pleaded successfully for a code based on the Code civil and
the WNH, resulting in the civil code of 1838.40)
The provisions of the civil code of 1838 regarding citizenship resembled those
in the Code civil and the WNH. 41) The basic principle remained the ius sanguinis,
granting Dutch citizenship to children of Dutch parents, wherever they were born.
The ius soli was also preserved, turning those born on the territory of the Kingdom
(including its overseas colonies) into Dutch citizens. This second principle was
applied more generously than in the Code civil, however. Firstly, these children
became Dutch immediately: they did not have to wait until they reached the age of
23. Secondly, they could opt for Dutch citizenship even if their parents did not have
residency in the Netherlands at the time they were born. They just had to take up
residency themselves within the borders of the Kingdom. But in one respect, the
new code was as stringent as its predecessors. Immigrants could still not acquire
Dutch citizenship merely by residency. Like under the regime of the Code civil and
the WNH, they had to turn to naturalisation.
The leniency of the civil code of 1838 as to the criteria for citizenship is
significant. It was in fact some kind of compromise between the relatively strict
provisions of the Code civil and the WNH on the one hand, and the very flexible
system of the Ancien Régime on the other hand. The return to leniency can be
explained by the fact that the strict requirements of the Code civil and the WNH had
only been introduced in the Netherlands as a result of French influence, not to
compensate for increasing political participation. With the French gone, there was
no reason to retain these requirements, since democratisation was still at its infancy.
In 1839, only a little over 3 % of the population had the right to vote.42)
The arrangements with regard to political participation and citizenship only
started to change after 1844, when one of the most important Dutch politicians of
the nineteenth century, Johan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798-1872), had entered the stage.
He is generally regarded as the spiritual father of the Constitution of 1848, which
laid the foundation both for the extension of suffrage, and for the heightening of the
status of Dutch citizenship.
40) Y.M.I. Greuter-Vreeburg, “De tranen van Joan Melchior Kemper, 1814-1824”, in Justitiële
Verkenningen 14/6 (1988), 15-22.
41) Cf. Arts. 5-13 Civil code 1838.
42) Blok, Stemmen en kiezen, 301.
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6. Johan Rudolf Thorbecke and the discovery of the Dutch nation, 1848-
1887
Partly for reasons of patriotism, Thorbecke was convinced that popular
sovereignty was the leading principle of his time, not unlike the Batavian
revolutionaries. He argued that over time Dutch society had developed into a state,
based on the historical unity of the Dutch people. This state, however, would only
be able to maintain its position internationally if it could rely on a ‘highly
developed national force’.43) To realise that ‘force’, it was necessary to imbue
citizens with a sense of being involved in the government of the state. To that end,
citizens should be granted ‘true and simple representation’ in local, provincial and
national government. The principle of universal suffrage was, according to
Thorbecke, inherent to the historical development of the Dutch state in the
nineteenth century.44)
For that reason, King William II (1792-1849) and his ministers undoubtedly
considered Thorbecke to be a dangerous Jacobin. He did not, however, embrace the
Rousseauian idea of unrestricted popular sovereignty, or the unbounded belief of
the Enlightenment philosophers in natural law. Thorbecke was of German descent
and had studied at German universities for several years. There, he got imbued by
the ideas of Romanticism and of the historical school of Friedrich Carl von Savigny
(1779-1861).45) He was also influenced by the political-theoretical theory of the
French liberal politician and historian François Guizot (1787-1874).46) In line with
his teachers, he rejected the view of the natural law philosophers that a society
could be created ex nihilo. Instead, he emphasised the importance of the organic
growth of a nation and its political system. Thus, Thorbecke designed a political
system based on popular sovereignty, but embedded in tradition. Or, as Thorbecke
himself formulated it, accepting popular sovereignty as the foundation of the Dutch
polity was inevitable, but it had to be tamed, preferably in a constitutional
monarchy.47)
43) Report of the Commission of March 17, 1848. W. Verkade, Overzicht der staatkundige
denkbeelden van Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798-1872) (Arnhem, 1935), 412-414. H. te
Velde, Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbesef. Liberalisme en nationalisme in Nederland, 1870-
1918 (The Hague, 1992), 21-25.
44) J.R. Thorbecke, “Over het hedendaagsche staatsburgerschap”, in Historische Schetsen (The
Hague, 1872), 84-96 (92).
45) J. Drentje, Thorbecke, Nederland en Europa. Het vrijste volk der wereld (Zwolle, 1998), 49-
52.
46) L.W.G. Scholten, Voetstappen van Thorbecke (Assen, 1966), 101-125.
47) Scholten, Voetstappen, 40-42.
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When Thorbecke was elected a Member of Parliament in 1844, he immediately
started pressing for a revision of the Constitution. He even produced a draft for a
new constitution with eight colleagues. It would take, however, four years and the
threat of revolution all over Europe before the government gave in. On 17 March
1848, a committee was appointed, charged with the task of preparing the revision.
Since this committee was headed by Thorbecke, it is hardly surprising that the draft
was ready within a month. He had taken his own proposal of 1844 as a point of
departure. As early as November 1848, the new Constitution came into effect.
As to political participation, some important changes were introduced. Firstly,
the members of Lower House of Parliament were now elected directly by the
voters.48) The right to vote remained, however, restricted to those who paid a
considerable amount of taxes. Consequently, the percentage of citizens with the
right to participate in the elections only rose slightly in the following years, from
7.3 % in 1848, to 12.1 % in 1879.49) Thorbecke favoured democratisation, but only
along gradual lines. This rise mainly resulted from economic growth and changes in
tax regulations, not from any change of principle. Secondly, the quality of ‘Dutch
citizen’ replaced the quality of ‘native’ as the essential requirement for exercising
political rights, including the eligibility to public offices.50) Thorbecke considered
this a crucial provision, because ‘the right to govern should not be granted to
foreigners’.51) Interestingly, in a textbook commenting on the Constitution of 1848,
this new provision was described as a necessary corollary of the extension of the
right to political participation.52)
The increased importance of being Dutch citizen with regard to political
participation was also reflected in the legislation on citizenship itself. Firstly,
Article 7 of the Constitution now demanded that the criteria for the acquisition of
citizenship were laid down in an Act of Parliament. From the parliamentary debates
on this provision, it becomes clear that some MPs considered citizenship so
important that they proposed to describe the requirements for citizenship
extensively in the Constitution itself. They argued that ‘the state is not so much
48) Cf. Art. 76 Constitution 1848.
49) R. de Jong, Van standspolitiek naar partijloyaliteit. Verkiezingen voor de Tweede Kamer
1848-1887 (Hilversum, 1999), 14. In 1850, 10.8 % of the population had the right to vote. In
1869, this had risen to 11.1 %.
50) Arts. 5-6, 76, 78-79, 123 and 139 Constitution 1848.
51) Handelingen omtrent het voorstel van negen leden der Tweede Kamer van de Staten-
Generaal, tot grondwets-herziening, in 1845 (The Hague, 1846), 57. Cf. also ibid., 6, 28 and
219.
52) C. van Bell, De Grondwet: met aantekeningen (Amsterdam, 1854), 21.
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defined by the size of its territory, but by the persons that legally belong to it’.53)
The government did not take up this proposal. Secondly, it was stated in the same
provision that for each individual naturalisation, previously a prerogative of the
government, an Act of Parliament was required. According to Thorbecke, this
provision was necessary since the requirement of Dutch citizenship for the
admission to public offices would be pointless, if the government could turn any
foreigner into a Dutch citizen.54)
The Act on Dutch Citizenship that was required by Article 7 Constitution 1848
was adopted in 1850. It did not replace the existing provisions of the civil code of
1838 on citizenship, but introduced the new status of ‘political citizens’ for the
inhabitants of the territories of the Kingdom in Europe. The criteria for acquiring
this status resembled those of the civil code, which meant that they too were
relatively generous.55) Children of Dutch parents or of parents who were domiciled
in the Netherlands were granted Dutch citizenship, wherever they were born.
Children born within the borders of the Kingdom in Europe while their parents did
not have residency could opt for Dutch citizenship by choosing domicile in the
Netherlands. The leniency of the Act of 1850 is understandable given the slow pace
of democratisation.
In one respect, however, the Act of 1850 brought about a major change. It
excluded the inhabitants of the overseas colonies, in particular of the Dutch East
Indies (present day Indonesia), from ‘political’ citizenship. In the explanatory
memorandum to the Act, it was argued that there was no good reason to consider
children born in those colonies of English, Spanish or Portuguese parents as
members of the Dutch nation.56) In addition, it was stated that by no means the
indigenous inhabitants of the colonies could pass for Dutchmen. There was some
resistance in Parliament to this strict interpretation of the ‘Dutch nation’. Some
delegates were convinced that the indigenous people would regard it an honour to
be Dutch. They also argued, more practically, that even if indigenous inhabitants of
the colonies would come to Europe, they had to meet the requirements of the census
before they could enjoy political rights. Thorbecke, who as Minister of the Interior
53) Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 1847-1848, p. 474.
J.C. Voorduin, Geschiedenis en beginselen der Grondwet (Utrecht, 1848), 96-97.
54) Handelingen omtrent het voorstel, 58.
55) Cf. Arts. 1 and 4 Wet betreffende het Nederlanderschap 1850.
56) L.F.G.P. Schreuder, Wetten van 28 Julij 1850 (Stb. no. 44), 21 December 1850 (Stb. no. 75)
en 3 Mei 1851 (Stb. no. 46), betreffende het Nederlanderschap, het Ingezetenschap en de
Naturalisatie (Schiedam, 1880), 28.
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was responsible for the Act of 1850, did not give in. In a lengthy reply, he
emphasised that it would be very problematic to regard as Dutchmen so many
persons, without any guarantee. In his view, it would create ‘a political community
of name only, not a community of a nation’. It would be more plausible, he argued,
‘to assign membership of the Dutch nation to Germans and Englishmen, than to the
indigenous inhabitants of Java and the Moluccas’.57)
It should be noted that because the provisions of the civil code of 1838 remained
in place, the inhabitants of the overseas colonies were still regarded as Dutch
citizens in the relation with other states. Obviously, since the introduction of the
Act of 1850, two different categories of Dutch citizens existed parallel to each
other, those with and those without the prospect of political participation.
7. Endgame: the Constitutions of 1887/1917/1922 and the Dutch Citizens
Act of 1892
In the first decades after 1850, the percentage of the population that was granted
the right to vote in this period remained low because of strict census criteria. In the
same period, the provisions on acquiring citizenship remained unchanged as well. A
fundamental change, however, was brought about by the new Constitution of 1887.
In this Constitution, new criteria for granting the right to vote were formulated,
replacing the strict census of the Constitution of 1848. In order to qualify for the
right to vote, a Dutch citizen was only required to show ‘signs of ability and
wealth’. As a result of these vague criteria, the percentage of the Dutch population
that was granted the right to vote rose rapidly. Within two years after the adoption
of the new Constitution, this percentage had more than doubled, to 26.5 % in 1889.
In 1899, it had already risen to 48.6 %. The final stage of this development was
reached with the Constitutions of 1917 and 1922, when universal suffrage was
introduced for men and women respectively.58)
In the Constitution of 1887, Dutch citizenship remained the essential
requirement for political participation, such as the right to vote and eligibility to
representative bodies.59) In Article 5 of this Constitution, it was now even explicitly
stated that foreigners were barred from public offices. The Constitutions of 1917
and 1922 did not bring any changes in this respect.60)
57) Schreuder, Wetten van 28 Julij 1850, 47-48.
58) Cf. Art. 81 Constitution 1922. Cf. also Art. 80 Constitution 1917.
59) Cf. Arts. 80, 84, 90, 94 and 134 Constitution 1887.
60) Cf. Arts. 5-6, 81, 85, 91 and 128 Constitution 1922. Cf. also Arts. 5-6, 80, 84, 90 and 127
Constitution 1917.
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In accordance with the slow pace of democratisation, the arrangement of Dutch
citizenship also remained largely unchanged for several decades after the adoption
of the Act on Dutch Citizenship of 1850. Even when, in 1882, the question of
citizenship came up for discussion again, because of the somewhat awkward
situation of having two different statutory regulations on citizenship, the draft for a
single Act on citizenship resembled to a large extent the Act of 1850.61) This draft
was never introduced to Parliament, however. The political climate was rapidly
becoming less favourable towards foreigners, since the government now considered
the criteria for acquiring citizenship as proposed in the draft too generous.62) It was
replaced by a much stricter bill. The result was the Act on Dutch Citizenship and
Residency, which came into force in 1892, only five years after the revision of the
Constitution in 1887.
The Act of 1892 replaced both the Act of 1850 and the arrangements in the civil
code of 1838 with regard to citizenship. In the new Act, the ius sanguinis took
centre stage. According to Article 1 Act 1892, only children of a Dutch father,
regardless where they were born, would acquire citizenship automatically.
Everybody else had to resort to the procedure of naturalisation. It is particularly
striking that birth on the territory of the Kingdom (ius soli) was no longer sufficient
for becoming a Dutch citizen.63) Obviously, it was believed that only being raised
by Dutch parents would foster the patriotic feelings that were deemed necessary.
The Act of 1892 had serious consequences for the indigenous inhabitants of the
Dutch colonies in the East. As mentioned earlier, these inhabitants had already been
deprived of political citizenship by the Act of 1850. From an international
perspective, however, they had remained Dutch subjects in accordance with the
(generous) provisions of the civil code of 1838. Since the Act of 1892 also replaced
these provisions, the question arose whether the indigenous inhabitants of the Dutch
East Indies should still be regarded as Dutch citizens under the new Act. With an
explicit reference to Thorbecke, it was argued that they should be deprived of
Dutch citizenship, because otherwise ‘a political community of name only, not a
community of a nation’ would be created. As a result, these inhabitants became
61) Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1888-1889, 49, nrs. 6, 7 and 11.
62) Heijs, Van Vreemdeling tot Nederlander, 66-67.
63) There were, of course, some exceptions. Cf. G.R. de Groot, “De geschiedenis van het
Nederlandse nationaliteitsrecht in de negentiende eeuw”, in Wordt voor Recht gehalden.
Opstellen ter gelegenheid van vijfentwintig jaar Werkgroep Limburgse Rechtsgeschiedenis
(1980-2005), ed. A.M.J.A. Berkvens/Th.J. van Rensch, (Maastricht, 2005), 375-420 (411).
Cf. above footnote 17.
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stateless.64) In view of the relations with other states, this was, of course, an
untenable situation. It eventually led to the rather strange Act on Dutch-Subjects-
Not-Citizens of 1910.65) In this Act, the indigenous inhabitants of the colonies in
the East were granted the status of ‘Dutch-subject-not Dutch-citizen’.
The Act of 1892 remained in force until 1985, but even today the ius sanguinis
is the leading principle in the Dutch provisions on citizenship.
8.  Concluding remarks
Until 1795, the relevance of Dutch citizenship was limited. It was, in particular,
not decisive for the admission to political participation. To that end, the criterion of
being born on the territory of one of the Dutch provinces was used. In accordance
with the insignificance of Dutch citizenship, it was relatively easily acquired by
choosing domicile in a province or city within the Dutch Republic. It was lost if a
person choose residency elsewhere. Obviously, being a Dutch citizen did not imply
membership of a semi-permanent political entity. Presently, citizenship is an
essential requirement for political participation in the Netherlands. It is a necessary
quality for the eligibility for important public offices and for the exercise of the
right to vote in most elections. At the same time, citizenship is not acquired so
easily anymore by foreigners, because the ius sanguinis is now the leading
principle. In this paper, the hypothesis was put forward that there is a connection
between the changes with regard to political participation, and the stricter
requirements for citizenship. It has been argued that granting the right to participate
in the political process to, in principle, all citizens, will result in stricter criteria as
to the admission to citizenship.
The sketch above of the historical development of citizenship and political
participation in the Netherlands between 1795 and 1922 clearly shows that this
connection is plausible. With the Batavian Revolution of 1795, which was partly
based on the principle of popular sovereignty, a process of democratisation started.
This immediately led to attempts to arrive at a precise and strict delineation of the
‘Batavian nation’. It was suggested that, in theory, all citizens should be able to
exercise political rights. In the end, however, the new concept of a sovereign
‘nation’ proved too revolutionary and the Batavian Republic too short lived for
these attempts to be successful. Consequently, the traditional system of the Ancien
64) The indigenous inhabitants of the overseas colonies in the West (present-day Suriname and
the Dutch Antilles) remained Dutch citizens according to the Act of 1892.
65) Wet op het Nederlands-onderdaanschap-niet-Nederlanderschap of February 10, 1910, Stb.
55.
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Régime was kept in place, which meant that not citizenship, but the fact of being
born on the territory of the Republic was used to restrict admission to political
participation.
With the fall of the Batavian Republic in 1806, the Netherlands came under
Napoleonic rule, which lasted to 1813. This also put an end to the democratic
experiment of the Batavian revolutionaries. Some changes with regard to the
criteria for admission to citizenship were brought about, however, not so much as a
corollary of democratisation, but as the result of the introduction of a civil code
under French influence. The traditional ius domicilii was replaced by a combination
of the principles of ius sanguinis and ius soli. The new provisions were less
generous, though not very strict. They affected in particular immigrants, since they
could no longer acquire Dutch citizenship merely by residency. They had to resort
to the procedure of naturalisation.
In 1813, the Netherlands regained independence, but the process of
democratisation was not resumed. The new King, a descendant from the House of
Orange, was as abhorrent of democracy as his Napoleonic predecessors.
Consequently, the criteria as to citizenship were not tightened either. In the first few
decades of the new Kingdom, the provisions of the French Code civil on citizenship
remained in force. In 1838, the criteria even became less strict with the introduction
of a new civil code, replacing the Code civil.
Only after 1848, the arrangements of political participation and citizenship
started to change substantially. These changes were brought about by one of the
leading politicians of his time, Johann Rudolf Thorbecke. Thorbecke was
convinced that the Dutch state would only be able to survive internationally, if its
citizens would be actively involved in politics, because this would make them loyal
to the ‘Dutch nation’. For that reason, he favoured the gradual extension of the right
to vote to all citizens. The Constitution of 1848, heavily influenced by the ideas of
Thorbecke, clearly shows that plans for further democratisation had some
consequences for the status of citizenship. In the new Constitution, Dutch
citizenship was introduced as the main requirement for political participation.
Thorbecke was, however, careful not to extend suffrage too rapidly. In particular
the requirements of census were such that in the first decades after the adoption of
the Constitution of 1848, still a small minority of citizens were allowed to vote. In
accordance with this, the criteria for the acquisition of citizenship also remained
generous. The only persons that were immediately affected by the new ideology
were the indigenous inhabitants of the Dutch colonies in the East. These
inhabitants, Thorbecke argued, could never be part of the ‘Dutch nation’.
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Consequently, they were excluded from political citizenship by the Act on Dutch
Citizenship of 1850, although they remained Dutch subjects in the relation with
other states by reason of the civil code of 1838.
In the Constitution of 1887, the strict census was replaced by the vague and
flexible requirement of ‘signs of ability and wealth’. As a result, the percentage of
those entitled to vote rose rapidly, to 48.6 % in 1899. The Constitutions of 1917 and
1922 completed the development by establishing universal suffrage for men and
women respectively. In this way, the quality of ‘Dutch citizen’ became the most
important threshold for admission to political participation. The effect on the
arrangements of citizenship is significant. Within five years after the adoption of
the Constitution of 1887, a very strict Act on citizenship was adopted, granting
Dutch citizenship only to children with a Dutch father. Moreover, since this Act on
Citizenship and Residency of 1892 replaced both the Act of 1850 and the relevant
provisions of the civil code of 1838, the indigenous inhabitants of the Dutch
colonies in the East were now excluded completely from citizenship. They became
stateless. Obviously, there is a close connection between expanding political
participation of members of the ‘nation’ and excluding foreigners from membership
of that ‘nation’.
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